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Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (January 17, 2013)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – CHOICE OF LAW AND ISSUE PRECLUSION
Summary
An appeal addressing the preclusive effect of a judgment entered by a federal district court
sitting in diversity.
Disposition
The Court affirmed the district court ruling but clarified that the controlling case is Semtek
International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 531 U.S. 497 (2001), not Bower v. Harrah’s
Laughlin, 125 Nev. 470 (2009). The preclusive effect of an issue decided by federal courts
sitting in diversity is determined by federal common law, which requires federal courts to apply
the law of the state in which the court sits. In this contract and tort action, the Court held that
issues decided by a New Jersey Federal District Court should be given preclusive effect by
applying New Jersey law, not federal law.
Factual and Procedural History
Upon the death of her husband in 2005, Kathryn Garcia submitted claims under life insurance
policies purchased from Prudential Insurance Company of America. The policies provided for
one lump sum to be paid promptly upon proof of death, but also provided payment options where
the benefits could be distributed over time.
Prudential’s standard claim form asked Garcia to select one of six payment options; “lump sum”
was not one of the options. The form also stated that, in the event of non-selection, Prudential
would establish an interest-earning “Alliance Account” in Garcia’s name from which Garcia
could make withdrawals at her preference. When Garcia did not select a payment option,
Prudential setup the account and sent blank checks and withdrawal slips to Garcia.2
In November 2008, Garcia, a domiciliary of Nevada, filed an action on behalf of herself and a
nationwide class of similarly situated persons in New Jersey federal court. Because Prudential’s
home state is New Jersey, the federal district court heard Garcia’s contract and tort claims in
diversity. In December 2009, the district court granted without prejudice Prudential’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
In September 2010, Garcia filed this action against Prudential in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Prudential filed a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5) for
failure to state a claim, arguing that her claims were precluded by the federal court decision.
After a hearing, the district court granted Prudential’s motion and dismissed all of Garcia’s
claims on issue preclusion grounds. This appeal followed.
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Seemingly, Garcia believed that Prudential breached the contract and duties of care, despite her ability to withdraw
the full amount of the claim from the Alliance Account.
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Discussion
The Court heard this appeal en banc. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion, with Justices Pickering,
Gibbons, Hardesty, Parraguirre, Cherry, and Saitta concurring.
New Jersey law applies
The Court used this case to clarify its opinion in Bower which held that a Nevada district court is
required to apply federal law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal decision. Because
Bower did not distinguish between federal question and diversity cases, the Court clarified that
Bower applies only to federal decisions on federal questions. Alternatively, under a 2001 U.S.
Supreme Court case, Semtek, a district court should apply state law to determine the preclusive
effect of decisions by a federal court sitting in diversity.
According to Semtek, a state district court determines preclusive effects by applying federal
common law. With regard to federal question cases, federal common law endeavors to develop a
uniform rule of preclusion.3 However, decisions rendered when the federal court is sitting in
diversity are, under federal common law, to be accorded the same claim-preclusive effect as a
state court decision in the state in which the federal court sits. And although Semtek addressed
claim preclusion, the court applied the holding to issue preclusion as well.
In this case, the New Jersey federal district court was sitting in diversity when it rendered the
decision at issue. Accordingly, New Jersey issue-preclusion law determines whether that
judgment precludes Garcia’s Nevada state court claims.
Garcia’s claims would be precluded under New Jersey law
Applying New Jersey law, a party asserting issue preclusion
must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the use decided in the prior
proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the
prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue
was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against who the doctrine is asserted
was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.4
The court acknowledged the similarity of federal and New Jersey preclusion law, but emphasized
that adherence to the correct method is systematically important. The issues raised by Garcia in
the Nevada complaint were identical in substance to those raised in New Jersey and, under New
Jersey law, the Garcia is precluded from relitigating those issues.
Conclusion
Justice Douglas concluded: “Although the district court erred in applying federal law instead of
state law to determine the preclusive effect of the federal court’s decision, it reached the correct
result because it correctly determined that Garcia is precluded from relitigating her claims.”
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